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RECENT DECISIONS
sin Court adopts such an intermediate view in the instant case. The
Court points out: that the testatrix failed to do anything to the phrase,
"The last three named legatees are my first cousins" (one of whom is
the deceased legatee through whose name she drew the line in question) ;
that the pencil lines and notations on the instrument were lightly
drawn; and that the testatrix was a good business woman who had had
her will drawn by competent attorneys and would hardly have expected
to accomplish its change in this way. The court decides that this is not
indicative of a finality of decision, but is perfectly consistent with an
intention to revise her will at a future time and that therefore no intent
to revoke can be inferred.
LAWRENCE BINDER
Workmen's Compensation Act-Exclusive Remedy Provision-
Effect on Husband's Action For Loss of Consortium -Action by
Frederick Guse against the A. 0. Smith Corporation to recover damages
for loss of consortium. Plaintiff's wife, an employee of defendant
corporation was injured through the negligence of defendant's em-
ployees during the course of her employment. Employer and employee
both being subject to the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act,
Mrs. Guse was awarded compensation thereunder. Plaintiff, contending
that his cause of action was independent of, and not derived from his
wife's cause of action for her personal injury, claimed that the Act had
not extinguished actions for loss of consortium by the husband of an
injured employee and commenced this action. Defendant in its answer
alleged that the wife's recovery of benefits under the Act constituted the
exclusive remedy against the Defendant by her or her dependents, in-
cluding Plaintiff, and further, that because of Plaintiff's failure to give
written notice to Defendant of his injuries within the period prescribed
in section 330.19 (5) Wisconsin Statutes, his action was not maintain-
able. Plaintiff appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his com-
plaint. Held: Where employee and employer are subject to the pro-
visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the liability of the em-
ployer for injuries sustained in the course of employment is solely under
the Act, and there is no liability in tort. The husband's action per quod
consortium amisit constituting an injury for which an employer might
be liable at common law was abrogated by the provisions of section
102.03 (2), Wisconsin Statutes. The husband's action was further
barred by reason of his failure to give written notice within the period
mark much more likely to be made by an inexperienced person who was con-
sidering a revision or change and contemplated that these words should
not be included in a new draft." City Nat. Bank v. Slocum, 272 F. 11,
Certiorari denied 257 U.S. 637, 42 S.Ct. 49 (1921).
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prescribed by section 330.19 (5), Wisconsin Statutes. Guse v. A. 0.
Smith Corporation, 260 Wis. 403, 51 N.W. (2d) 24 (1952).
The nature of employers' liability under workmen's compensation
laws, and the basis for recovery thereunder, has been the subject of
some interesting litigation, and even more interesting solutions thereto.'
While legislative bodies in enacting such laws acknowledged that the
employer's liability thereunder was to be based solely on the statutes and
not on tort or contract principles, and while the socio-economic aims and
objectives of this type of legislation received general approbation and
acceptance, the legislative enactments themselves and judicial interpreta-
tions concerning the limitations and extensions thereof have been far
from uniform. Centuries of application of the principles of duty, breach
of duty, negligence, fault and proximate cause to personal injury cases
gave place only grudgingly to the realization that workmen's compensa-
tion acts are completely dissociated from the principles of common law
tort liability.2
Compensation acts are of two types, compulsory and elective. Wis-
consin's act is of the latter type, and as is generally the case with this
type, provides that employers who accept its terms shall, under certain
conditions, compensate injured employes without regard to questions of
negligence and fault; and that employers who do not accept the Act shall
be deprived of such common law defenses as contributory negligence
and assumption of risk; on the other hand, employes electing to be
bound by the terms of the Act are restricted to the amount and type of
recovery permitted thereiunder. To effect the laudable purpose of the
Act, liberal interpretation of its terms was deemed essential and was
accordingly prescribed at an early stage in its history.3 One area of
conflict with which this direction to liberal interpretation has dealt is
that concerning how far the exclusive remedy provisions of the act.
have abrogated the common law rights of action of employes, and those
connected with them, who are entitled to compensation under the Act.
The principal case is one involving this problem.
The section of the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act con-
trolling in this case reads:
"Where such conditions (employment and compensable injury)
exist, the right to the recovery of compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against
the employer."4
The court in the principal case, in analyzing this statute held that it leads
1 Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORN.
L. Q. 206 (1952):
2 Ibid.
3 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
4 WIs STATS. (1949) see. 102.03 (2). As originally enacted by Chap. 50, Laws of
1911, this statute was entitled sec. 2394-4, and read: "Liability for the compen-
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irresistably to the conclusion that the legislature intended the compensa-
tion recoverable by injured employes under the Act to be a complete
substitute for the tort liability of employers at common law to employees
and all connected with them. In support of this conclusion, Chief justice
Fritz first of all directs attention to the reasoning in the case of Borgnis
v. Falk Co.5 which set forth the then highly controversial purposes for
which the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation law was enacted, i.e.,
the substitution of an absolute, limited and determinate liability of em-
ployers for the uncertain and unsatisfactory common law tort liability
for industrial injuries. The court then proceeds to an examination of
cases which illustrate the' purely statutory nature of an employer's
liability under the Act. It would seem that most of the cases cited are
distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. Four of these cases,
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co.,8 Knoll v. Shaler, Clark v. Chicago
M. St. P. & P. R. Co., and Heist v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light &
Power Co.9 involved actions by representatives or dependents of de-
ceased employes against the decedents' employers. In each case it was
held that the employer sustained no tort liability to employes or their
dependents and that their sole liability was for compensation under the
Act. The Saxhaug v. Forsyth Leather Co.,10 and Vick v. Browni" cases
involved actions by dependents of deceased employes against negligent
third parties, while the case of Buggs v. Wolff' 2 was an action by an
injured employe against such a third party. In each of the latter cases
it was held that an employer was not a tortfeasor as to an injured or
deceased employe and hence there could be no common liability between
such employers and third parties who as to the employes were tort-
feasors. Thus, the principles of contribution and release applicable to
joint-tortfeasors were not applicable. Further, since the Act provides
for recovery of compensation by injured employes, and in the event of
their death by specially designated classes of dependents, the employers
had already paid or were required by the terms of the Act to pay,
compensation under the Act.
Common to all of the above noted cases is a reference to the ex-
clusive remedy provisions of the statute under consideration. In the
sation hereinafter provided for, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, shall
exist against an employer for any personal injury accidentally sustained by his
employee, and for his death." The revisor's bill which changed this section-to
its present form in 1931 expressly negated any intent to change its meaning.
5 Supra, note 3.
6 169 Wis. 106, 107 N.W. 275 (1919).
T 180 Wis. 66, 192 N.W. 399 (1923).
8 214 Wis. 166, 252 N.W. 685 (1934).
9 172 Wis. 393, 179 N.W. 583 (1920).
10 252 Wis. 376, 31 N.W. (2d) 589 (1948).
11255 Wis. 147, 38 N.W. (2d) 716 (1949).
12 201 Wis. 533, 230 N.W. 621 (1930).
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Clark case,'3 the court stated that an employer bound by the Workmen's
Compensation Act sustained no tort liability to its workmen or their
dependents. Similarly, in the Vick v. Brown case, 14 the court said: "The
liability of (employer) . . . to (employee) . . . and his dependents is
solely under the Workmen's Compensation Law. There is no liability
?n tort." In the Saxhaug v. Forsyth Leather Co. case,' 5 the widow of a
deceased employe, clearly a dependent under section 102.51 (1) of the
Act, was the Plaintiff, and as a dependent her sole cause of action
against the employer was under the terms of the Act. As to her, the
employer could not be a tortfeasor. In connection with these consider-
ations, attention is invited to the fact that the Plaintiff in the principal
case based his claim on the alleged breach of an independent duty owed
to him by the Defendant, and not as an employe or dependent. Though
the plaintiffs in the Anderson", and Knoll 7 cases were also dependents,
the references therein to the exclusive remedy provisions appear to be
less definitive in their scope. In the Anderson case' 8 the court held that
an employer covered by the Act, in the event of an injury to an
employee:
"... becomes liable therefore in the manner and to the extent
prescribed by the workmen's compensation act, and he has no
other or different liability. The right of the employee to recover
the compensation provided for by the Act is exclusive of all other
remedies against the employer for any injury which the employee
may sustain, and in the event of his death the same limitation
applies to his personal representatives."
In the Knoll case 9 the court held that:
"As has been many times stated, this is a substitute for the
liability of the employer at common law. . . . It seems clear
therefore that, when the Legislature provided by section 2394-4
that the compensation under the act 'shall be the exclusive
remedy against the employer for such injury or death,' it was
intended to include, and did include, all injuries for which the
employer might be liable at common law..."
Unless in making these statements, the courts had reference solely to
the particular fact situations of the cases, quite clearly, the above quo-
tations seem to support the holding that the Act entitles certain classes
to compensation, and abrogates the common law rights of action of
those not embraced within its terms.
1aSupra, note 8.
14 Supra, note 11, p. 155.
25Supra, note 10.
26Supra, note 6.
7Supra, note 7.
18 Supra, note 6, p. 115.
19 Supra, note 7, p. 69.
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The court also finds a basis for its decision in the case of Deluhery v.
Sisters of St. Mary.20 This was an action by the father of a minor child
to recover for medical expenses incurred in the treatment of injuries
sustained by the minor in the course of her employment with the de-
fendent. Again the court held that the exclusive liability of defendent
to its employes was under the terms of the Act, hence it necessarily
followed that the father's common law right was barred. It should be
noted that the Act binds the employer to pay for such medical expenses,
so that the employer's statutory liability to pay such expenses is clearly
substituted for his common law liability to pay as a tortfeasor. It should
also be noted that no demand was made on the employer to pay these
expenses. Unfortunately, the Act contains no such express provisions
substituting statutory liability for the loss of the Plaintiff in the principal
case.
Danek v. Hommer,2 ' was a New Jersey case which is clearly in point
both on facts and holding. In that case the court held that:
".. . it was the intention of the New Jersey Legislature in adopt-
ing the Workmen's Compensation Act, to enact a complete sub-
stitute for these previously unsatisfactory remedies in tort on the
part of employee and those connected with him .... "
Since the problem is one of statutory interpretation, the applicable
section of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Law should be
referred to.
"Such agreement (to come within the terms of the act) shall be a
surrender of the parties thereto of their rights to any other
method . . of compensation ...and shall bind the employee
himself and for compensation for his death . .. his personal
representatives, his widow, and next of kin ....
The express wording of the statute and the precedent of cases on the
precise problem in question in New Jersey23 would clearly appear to
validate the holding contra to the husband-plaintiff, yet the court in the
Danek case 24 went so far as to say that the plaintiff might have made a
good argument from a verbalistic standpoint, contending that the word-
ing of the statute is not as express as it should be in the light of the
well known principle that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed, if early New Jersey decisions holding otherwise
had not been permitted to stand by the legislature for so long without
change in the law. Since the Wisconsin Statute is not as definitive on
this point as the New Jersey Statute, and the Wisconsin court had no
20 244 Wis. 254, 12 N.W. (2d) 49 (1943).
21 14 N. J. Super. 607, 82 A. (2d) 659 (1951).
22 RS. 34:15-8, N.J.S.A.2 3 Bums v. Vilardo, 26 N.J.M. 277, 60 A. (2d) 94 (1948).
24 Supra, note 21.
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previous cases in point on which to rely, the weight accorded the Danek
case25 may seem'questionable.
In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. Inc.,26 a wife was permitted to recover
for loss of consortium resulting from injuries received by her husband
in the course of employment with defendent company. The husband
had received compensation under The Federal Longshoremen and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Section 905 of that act provided
that:
"The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this
chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee, his legal representatives, husband
or wife, parents, dependents ......
The court interpreted this section to apply only to the case of one suing
in the employee's right, and Judge Clark in reference to the section
stated that:
"Moreover it would be contrary to reason to hold that this Act
cuts off indepefident rights of third persons when the whole
structure demonstrates that it is designed to compensate injured
employee's rights .... It can hardly be said that it was intended
to deprive third parties of independent causes of action where the
Act does not even purport to compensate them for any loss .... ,27
The Wisconsin court in rejecting the applicability of this case to the
principal case pointed to the difference in the statutory provisions and
held that the continuing tort liability attached to the employer by that
decision and the authorities relied on therein~s was inimicable to the
Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act. On the factor of statutory
differences, it would appear that the New Jersey statute bears closer
resemblance to the provisions of the Federal Longshoremen and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act than it does to Wisconsin's exclusive
remedy provision, and that the decision in the Hitaffer case2 9 is more
surprising in view of the statute there applicable, than the instant de-
cision (or one contrary to it) appears -in the light of the somewhat
general terms of the Wisconsin statute.
The Wisconsin court joins the majority in aligning itself with those
jurisdictions which hold that the workmen's compensation law operates
as a complete substitute for all the common law tort liability of an
employer to his employees. Reference should be made however to the
25 Ibid.
2687 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F. (2d) 811 (1950).
27 Ibid., p. 820.
2 8 Rich. v. United States, 177 F. (2d) 688 (2d Cir., 1949), and The Tampico, 45 F.
Supp. 174 (D.C. N.Y., 1942) which held that an employer who pays compensa-
tion under the Federal Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
is not thereby rendered immune to contribution to third party tortfeasors.
29 Supra, note 26.
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statutes of other jurisdictions to determine whether their decisions are
predicated on similar bases.
Other jurisdictions have arrived at contrary decisions. In King v.
Viscoloid Co.,30 an action by parents of a minor child to recover for loss
of earnings following his injury in the course of employment, the court
held that the parents' right of action was independent of the child's
right to compensation under the compensation act. The statute did not
clearly remove the parents' right and the court said:
... we have no right to conjecture what the legislature would
have enacted if they had foreseen the occurrence of a case like
this; much less can we read into the statute, a provision which
the legislature did not see fit to put there, whether the omission
came from inadvertance or of set purpose ... an existing com-
mon law right of action is not to be taken away by statute unless
by direct enactment or necessary implication .... -31
Allen v. Trester 2 was a similar action also decided in the parents' favor.
The statute in that jurisdiction refers to the agreement to be bound by
the act and states that such agreement:
cc shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to
any other method, form or amount of compensation. '38
It would appear that the question presented in the principal case
might have been resolved by a consideration of the nature, in Wisconsin,
of a husband's action per quod, i.e., whether independent or derivative.
While the court did not discuss this aspect of the problem, its reliance on
New Jersey decisions (where such an action is expressly held deriv-
ative)3 4 and the fact that the Plaintiff used this contention as one of the
bases for -appeal, probably warrant the conclusion that it did enter into
the courts' deliberation. Although there are authorities which hold that
a husband's action for loss of consortium is entirely distinct from that
which may be maintained by the wife for the original tort itself,35 Wis-
consin holds that such an action is derivative. In Stuart v. Winnie36 a
husband's action to recover for loss of his wife's services and for
medical expenses incurred on her behalf was barred because of the
contributory negligence of the wife. The decision was not based on
imputation of negligence, but on the theory that the husband derived his
cause of action through assignment by operation of law of a part of his
wife's cause of action. The husband, in keeping with accepted principles
of assignment took his cause of action subject to defenses good against
30 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914).
3'Ibid., p. 989.
32 112 Nebr. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924).
n NEBR. Coip. ST. (1922), sec. 3034.
SSupra, note 23.
35 PROSSER ON TORTS, sec. 102, p. 939.
36217 Wis. 298, 258 N.W. 611 (1935).
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the wife.3 7 Since the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act pre-
cludes recovery by the wife except under its terms, and Mrs. Guse had
already recovered compensation under that Act, the derivative nature of
the husband's cause of action would seem to be dispositive of his con-
tentions here. Conversely, to arrive at the instant decision without ref-
erence to the character of an action for loss of consortium would appear
to necessitate a strained construction of the statute.
HUGH R. O'CONNELL
s3 This assignment theory was first definitively set down in the case of Callies v.
Reliance Laundry, 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925). The theory is discussed
in an analysis of the Callies case in 2 UNIV. CH. L. REv. 173 (1935). The
application of this rule might present some interesting questions in cases in
which the basis for the husband's action is either seduction of the wife,
debilitation of the wife through providing her with habit forming drugs, or
criminal abortion. Would it be held in these situations that the wife's consent
constituted a defense to the husband's action?
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